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A: Introduction 
Greenland was catapulted into international headlines in the summer of 2019, when 
President Donald Trump expressed a desire to buy it for the USA, and was most aggrieved to 
be very firmly turned down.  One particularly unfortunate dimension in the whole debacle 
was that he at no stage made any reference to the wishes or views of the Greenlandic 
Government or its People.1  Such a move could not have been more out of step with the 
culture of Danish politics in recent decades. 
From the later part of the twentieth century onwards, developments towards building 
Greenlandic territorial autonomy have been rolling along peacefully and incrementally. The 
situation has not garnered much attention in comparison with paradigms of ongoing tension 
and conflict, such as clashes between the Spanish State and the Catalan regional authorities,2 
or political flashpoints in the Brexit process around Scotland and Northern Ireland. 3 
Journalists and academics alike are enticed by confrontation and dysfunction: calm progress 
 
* We are indebted to Isil Araf, Jean D’Aspremont, Tom Lewis and Dawn Oliver, as well as the anonymous 
reviewer, for their insightful comments on the first draft of this article. 
1 ‘I thought it was a joke: Former Greenland PM on Trump wanting to buy the country’ Channel 4 News (21 
August 2019) https://www.channel4.com/news/i-thought-it-was-a-joke-former-greenland-pm-on-trump-
wanting-to-buy-the-country  
2 S Balbour, “The Catalan and Spanish Crisis: A European Perspective” LSE European Politics and Policy Blog (3 
July 2018) https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/07/03/the-catalan-and-spanish-crisis-a-european-
perspective/  
3 N Skoutaris “Brexit is a Form of Secession: Scotland and Northern Ireland Might Soon Follow” LSE European 
Politics and Policy Blog (2 May 2019) https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/05/02/brexit-is-a-form-of-secession/ 
mediated through democratic decision-making is not especially rock and roll.  Nevertheless, 
we may often derive crucial insights from success stories, if we are minded to look for them. 
The final destiny of Greenland is still to be written, its population may conclude that their 
interests are best served by enjoying a high degree of self-governance within Denmark, or 
alternatively, their trajectory may ultimately be to assume sovereign status.4  The purpose of 
this article is not to speculate about which pathway would be preferable; rather, we are 
interested in one particular aspect of the situation, and any general conclusions which 
constitutional lawyers may gain from it. Our lens is focused on the implications of the 
Greenlandic People as an identifiable community with in the Danish State. 
As we shall discuss further and in depth below, academic and political commentators alike 
acknowledge that the population of Greenland are a “People” for the purposes of 
International Law. 5 This has been a crucial factor in successive Danish Governments accepting 
their claim to chart their own future course.  In this article, we propose to explore how 
constitutional lawyers might respond to the challenge of distinct Peoples within States, taking 
account both of the collective rights of such groups, and also the need to maintain stability 
and cohesion for the State.  
We use the Greenlandic paradigm to draw out two points: firstly, how arriving at the 
designation of a People is an inherently complex process; and secondly, why reaching an 
affirmative conclusion on the question of peoplehood for a distinct population need not 
automatically have negative implications for the stability, integrity or social cohesion of a 
 
4 For a consideration of some of the competing issues at stake, see D Rezvani, Surpassing the Sovereign State: 
The Wealth. Self-Rule and Security Advantages of Partially Independent Territories (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 
5 E.g. A Henriksen, International Law (Oxford: OUP) 2019, 68 
State.  In carrying out our analysis, we shall approach our key question via the following 
stepping stones: 
1) What is the definition of a People for the purposes of International Law? 
2) How does this definition relate to Greenland? 
3) What lessons can we learn about the relationship between membership of Peoples 
and citizenship of States?   
4) What is the proper response of States to the existence of distinct Peoples when it 
comes to ordering their constitutional and legal frameworks? 
 
B: What is the definition of a People for the purposes of International Law? 
The term People appears in the text of some key international instruments. For example, the 
United Nations Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970 applies it in relation to self-
determination.6  This document aims to restate the guiding principles of the United Nations, 
which include self-determination for all Peoples.7  However, there is a double sting in the tail: 
1) an universally agreed or accepted definition of a People for the purposes of International 
Law does not exist;8 and 2) there is great controversy as to whether any legally binding right 
to self-determination applies beyond of the context of decolonisation.9 As a starting point, 
 
6  Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations) adopted by UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 
1970 
7 This was already set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Res 2200A (XXI) 
(16/12/1966) signed in 1966 and coming into force in 1976.  Furthermore, a recent decision of the 
International Court of Justice stated that the right to self-determination had been part of customary law from 
as early as 1960.  See Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, 
International Court of Justice 25/2/19 
8 S Wheatley, Democracies, Minorities and International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2005) 117 
9 A Coleman, Resolving Claims to Self-Determination: Is there a role for the International Court of Justice 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 60 
the work of Raič demonstrates that the characteristics of statehood are undoubtedly distinct 
from those of peoplehood.10 Furthermore, as Thornberry persuasively argues, the concept of 
a People may actually be a malleable one, which is construed differently in relation to 
different rights.11  For current purposes, self-determination is the sphere which currently 
interests us most, and therefore we shall focus on this context in assessing the meaning of 
self-determination. 
Academic commentators in this arena have attempted to fill the formal definitional gap. For 
example, the leading scholar Wheatley asserts that the term People undoubtedly covers the 
populations of sovereign States and independent territories, as well as non-self-governing 
territories and populations of trust.12  The statement opens up a complexity to which we shall 
return later:  if this contention is correct and the populations of sovereign States and 
territories within them can both simultaneously constitute Peoples, there is clearly scope for  
overlap at an individual and community level, e.g. a person or a group may be Greenlandic 
and Danish, claiming membership of two distinct Peoples for the purposes of International 
Law.   
 Wheatley also quotes with approval Anaya’s contention that the ‘plain meaning’ of the term 
must surely encompass indigenous groups.13  Given that the population of Greenland are 
resident within a sub-State entity which might reasonably be classified as at least a quasi-
independent territory, and as Hubbard shows, are also accepted as an indigenous group for 
 
10 D Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (New York: Kluwer, 2002) 10-17 
11 P Thornberry, “The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination, with some remarks on Federalism” 
in C Tomuschat (ed) The Modern Law of Self-Determination (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 109-138, 124 
12 S Wheatley, Democracies, Minorities and International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2005) 117 
13 S J Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 1996) 77 
the purposes of various international instruments,14 there is ample support for the contention 
by commentators (for instance Said15 and Gilbert16) that they fit very comfortably within the 
definition of a People.  Furthermore, this is a position officially accepted by the Danish 
Government, which as Takahashi argues, unequivocally recognises this status, whilst desiring, 
if possible, to maintain the territory’s place within its State for strategic and economic 
reasons.17  Independently of any International Law obligation, Denmark acknowledged the 
reality on the ground, and has taken legal and constitutional steps to address it.  Furthermore, 
this added another dimension to the Danish indignation at President Trump’s bid to buy 
Greenland like a strip of garden.18  The mere suggestion that the authorities in Copenhagen 
would be willing to barter effectively implied a lack of sincerity in their moral commitments. 
Nevertheless, from the point of view of Constitutional Law, it is not satisfactory to simply 
assert that a “People” is like an elephant, in the sense of being easy to identify but hard to 
describe. When addressing the context of Quebec, Van der Vyver usefully provided a 
summary of the characteristics which afford a community the status of a People: 
“a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion, language and 
traditions of their own, united by this identity of race, religion, language and traditions in a 
sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of 
 
14 R Hubbard, “Mining in Greenland and Free, Prior and Informed Consent: A Role for Corporations?” Nordic 
Environmental Law Journal (2014) 1, 98, 102 
15 M Said, “Birth-pangs: Greenland’s Struggle for Independence” Loyola of Los Angeles Comparative Law 
Review, 281, 283 
16 J Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights Under International Law: From Victims to Actors (New York: 
Transnational Publishers, 2007), 244 
17 M Takahashi, “The Politics of the Right to Self-Determination: Reframing the Debate on Greenland’s 
Autonomy” Eurasia Border Review (2016) 6:1, 25, 31-32 
18 ‘Donald Trump and Greenland: Why would he want to buy it?’ BBC News (21 August 2019) 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-49422832  
worship, ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit 
and traditions of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other.”19 
We would argue that this definition is useful and worth pursuing for two reasons.  Firstly, the 
very fact that Peoples are a reality which International Law takes cognisance of is highly 
relevant. Even though claims to self-determination, or indeed other rights, on this basis may 
be shaky (in light of both the lack of a definition, and also the debate around scope of its 
application beyond paradigms of decolonisation), they still provide leverage in the political 
sphere.20  And secondly, distinct Peoples within the wider State population are an observable 
reality in many countries, and would demand a domestic constitutional response irrespective 
of International Law.   
It would be difficult to cite an example of a group or territory embroiled in debates around 
autonomy or independence, such as Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia or Easter Island, which did 
not at least have an arguable case to come within Van de Vyver’s definition. In light of this, 
we propose to pause to consider how the various elements of this formula relate to 
Greenland, as a particularly solid and archetypal example of a People. We have chosen it 
precisely because of the unanimity in this regard, as the degree of ambiguity even in such 
quintessential paradigm reveals how much scope there is for uncertainty in other, less clear-
cut cases.  
But beforehand, it is necessary to place this analysis within the framework of the Danish 
constitutional context, given that some of our definitional factors are closely related to this 
 
19 J Van Der Vyver, “Self-Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under International Law” Journal of 
Translation Law & Policy ”(2000) 10:1, 17. 
20 A Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 143-154; D 
Murswiek,”The Right to Secession Reconsidered” (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 21-40, 25 
context. For instance, having asserted above that Greenland might be described as at least a 
quasi-independent territory, it is incumbent upon us to justify that contention. 
 
 
C: How does our definition of a People relate to the Greenlandic context? 
C1: Greenland and the Danish Constitutional Framework 
Greenland, the world’s largest island, is an autonomous territory of the Danish State. It has 
legislative powers, and control over all government areas excepting foreign policy and 
security, monetary systems, certain aspects of the police and justice frameworks, and of 
course, constitutional matters. 21  But beyond this, where does it sit at present within the 
Danish jurisdictional backdrop? 
Denmark is a constitutional Monarchy and a parliamentary Democracy. 22   Although still 
undeniably a unitary State,23 Denmark is now organised on a decentralised basis, with five 
regions24 and ninety-eight municipalities.25  It also has two autonomous territories, each with 
a special status, Greenland being one, and the Faroe Islands the other. As far as the Faroe 
Islands are concerned, it is interesting to note that, as Suksi observes, their unique position 
 
21 European Committee of the Regions, Division of Powers, Denmark 
https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/countries/MembersNLP/Denmark/Pages/default.aspx  
22 The Constitutional Act of Demark 1953, Arts 2 and 3 
23 See for example The Constitutional Act of Demark 1953, Arts 2 and 3 
24 Nordjylland, Midtjylland, Syddanmark, Sjælland (Zealand) and Hovedstaden (the capital region) 
25 V Andersen, ‘Denmark’ in Changing Government Relations in Europe: From Localism to 
Intergovernmentalism, M Goldsmith and C Page (eds) (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 47-50 
has been granted by legislation,26  and it is not enshrined in the Constitution, despite the fact 
that its arrangements predated the current 1953 Constitution by five years.27   
It is true that certain provisions of the Constitution do concern the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland. For instance, Art 28 stipulates that each territory shall send two members to the 
Folketing (the unicameral State Parliament, consisting of 179 MPs). 28  Nevertheless, the 
fundamental form and status for each territory is only guaranteed by legislation, which could 
in theory be repealed.  Of course, as a sovereign State, Denmark is in theory at liberty to 
change its Constitution, meaning that no mechanism would ever secure its current rights in 
perpetuity. Even so, the requirements for constitutional amendment in Denmark are 
deliberately very onerous and heavily favour the status quo. Thus, the purely legislative 
nature of the existing arrangements is not an insignificant consideration.29 
Having taken stock of the domestic legal framework in relation to Greenland, we now return 
to the factors within Van de Vyver’s definition and the basis for concluding that we are not 
dealing simply with governance structure of a province, but the provisions in place in respect 
of a distinct People within the State of Denmark. 
 
C2: Characteristics which define a People 
a) Persons living in a given country or locality” 
 
26 Home Rule Act 1948 
27 M Suksi, Double Enumeration of Legislative Powers in a Sub-State Context: A Comparison between Canada, 
Denmark and Finland (London: Springer, 2018 ) 6 
28J Magone, Contemporary European Politics A Comparative Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 206 
29 Constitution of Denmark Part 10 para 88 provides that amendments require a majority in two consecutive 
Folketing: before and after a general election. In addition, the change must be approved by referendum, with 
at least 40% of voting age population endorsing it. 
The question of land is always powerful and painful where aboriginal Peoples are 
concerned. 30  The Inuit are considered indigenous people in Greenland, and a deep 
connection with the land is embedded into their identity and spirituality.31  Approximately 
89% of the population are Inuit,32 meaning that the territory is overwhelmingly indigenous in 
character. Yet, arguably, none of the current residents are truly autochthonous, given that 
the first waves of Palaeolithic settlers died out, and there is no strong genetic link between 
them and the modern population.33  As a result, the use of rhetoric surrounding the “original” 
human settlement of Greenland is controversial, with some of the contemporary Inuit 
community highlighting the strong cultural associations between themselves and societies 
occupying the land for millennia, whilst others vociferously rejecting what they see as 
foundational narratives based on a lie.34    
History of the Nordic occupation of the island is, if anything, even more mired in controversy.  
Without question, Viking settlors arrived in the Middle Ages, and maintained a successful and 
sophisticated society for several hundred years, but ultimately perished or departed. 35  
Beyond these bare bones though, the story is hotly contested, and it is not known whether 
the descendants of the Viking arrivals fell victims of climate change, plague, political pressure 
or even violent conflict with the Inuit population.36  Continental Europe last heard from the 
 
30 For example, the International Labour Organisation, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
No 169 (1989), 29 
31 M Plato, “Participatory engagement and empowerment of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples” Environmental 
Law Review (March 2017) 19(1), 30 
32 J Ferrante, Sociology: A Global Perspective (Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2013),360 
33 See further: R McGhee, Ancient People of the Arctic (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press: 
Vancouver 2001) 
34 M Breum, The Greenland Dilemma: The quest for independence, underground riches and the troubled 
relations with Denmark (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2015) Chapter 10 
35 A Nedkvitne, Norse Greenland: Viking Peasants in the Arctic (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).  See in particular 
Chapters 2-5 
36 K Seaver, The Last Vikings: The Story of the Great Norse Voyages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 
2010) 160-169 
Norse population in Greenland in the late XIV century, and when long-term contact between 
European and Inuit communities was finally re-established in 1721, 37  Hans Egede, the 
Lutheran priest who led the expedition, was motivated primarily by the hope of finding the 
lost community.38 
Regardless, events of the Middle Ages did not render later Danish colonial activity any less 
oppressive for the Inuit communities who lived through it,39  and nothing in our argument 
should be read as a plea in mitigation for eighteenth and nineteenth century imperialism.  
 
b) Race 
It cannot be denied that the meaning, and indeed usefulness, of the term race is the subject 
of academic dispute amongst anthropologists.40 There are multiple understandings of the 
concept and systems of classification, a reality which has profound practical implications. For 
instance, the options for those completing the 2011 UK census41 were very different from 
those currently provided by the United States Census Bureau when it came to self-
identification. 42   In Europe, very few people would consider a native Spanish speaker, 
particularly one who happened to have light skin and green eyes, as a different race from a 
 
37 G Gibon, The Sioux: The Lakota and Dakota Nations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004) 
38 C Markham, “Hans Egede and Danish Greenland” The Lands of Silence: A history of Arctic and Antarctic 
Exploration (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) Chapter 13, 158-164, 158-159  
39 D Brown, Bury my Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West (New York: Sterling, 
2000) Parallels might be drawn with the North American mainland.  Conflict and displacement between Native 
Peoples did not lessen the injustice of US government policy in the 19th century. 
40 P Wade, What is race? An Introduction (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) 
41 Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/ethnicity/articles/ethnicityandnatio
nalidentityinenglandandwales/2012-12-11  
42United States Census Bureau https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218  
British, French or Italian individual with the same physical characteristics.  In contrast, the 
default categorisation would be Hispanic in the contemporary United States.43 
Equally, at the risk of stating the obvious, despite its malleable and disputed nature, race as a 
concept is recognised across a multitude of jurisdictions, and a plethora of legal instruments, 
both international and domestic. 44  It is unquestionable that race is a concern for lawyers and 
policymakers, and that negative experiences of racial discrimination and prejudice have a real 
and all too observable impact on lives.45 
Notwithstanding, where a community is seeking to assert its collective identity as a People, 
the fluid and controversial dimension to the definition of race can prove a complicating factor, 
because there is a real risk that racial lines may be drawn in places which suit the political or 
ideological ends of the observers.46 
As has already been stated, the majority of the population living within Greenland identify as 
Inuit.47  Ironically, the individuals who drew the modern political maps struggled to survive in 
this extreme environment, and the entire thrust of the East Greenland Case lay in Denmark’s 
ability to assert its sovereignty over the land without the need to demonstrate a great deal in 
the way of active occupation. 48 
 
43 C Rodriguez, Changing Race: Latinos, the Census and the History of Ethnicity in the United States (New York: 
New York University Press, 2000) 
44 See for example European Convention on Human Rights, Article 14 “The enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status.” 
45 S Virdee, Race, Class and the Racialized Outsider (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 
46 A Fieras, Racisms in a Multicultural Canada: Paradoxes, Politics and Resistance (Ontario: Wilfred Lerner 
University, 2014) 72 
47 L Dorais, Language of the Inuit: Syntax, Semantics and Society in the Arctic (Montreal: McGill Queens 
University Press, 2010), 3 
48 Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v Norw ay) [1933] PCIJ Reports, Series A/B No: 53 
It is also the case that the totemic power of the imagined “lost Vikings” has exerted a real 
influence at various moments in history, with the legend of the “blond Eskimo,49 and as late 
as the early twentieth century, the Anglican Church launched a campaign to convert these 
“lost” Europeans. 
As Zeitzen argues, the survival of the Inuit in conditions which defeated the Norse posed 
problems for those who deemed them primitive.50  The inference that they had at the very 
least mixed their genetics with the Vikings provided a palatable explanation for prejudiced 
observers, and fitted with the politicised use of Darwinian theory.51 However, from a XXI 
century vantage point, all scientific indicators point towards the two historical populations 
having remained separate.52  The myth of the blond Eskimo remains just that, but myths hold 
power, and it has shaped the destiny of Greenland.  
Neither have we moved beyond confused or divisive thinking on race.  For instance, in writing 
about Greenland, Loukacheva acknowledges that she frequently applies the term 
‘Greenlander’ to mean “indigenous residents who identify themselves as Greenlanders and 
represent Greenland as a nation of Greenlanders”.53   
This is a worrying direction of travel.  A substantial minority of the population, more than one 
in ten in fact, are not ethnically Inuit,54 and being Inuit and part of the Greenlandic society are 
clearly not coterminous as concepts.  In the Greenlandic Representation to the European 
 
49 J Steckley, White Lies About the Inuit (Ontario: Broadview Press: Ontario, 2008) 89 
50 M Zeitzen, Polygamy: A Cross Cultural Analysis (London: Bloomsbury, 2008) 43 
51 R Weikart, From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics and Racism in Germany (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan,2006) 
52 N Lynnerup, The Greenland Norse: A biological anthropological study (Copenhagen: Commission for Scientific 
Research on Greenland,1998), 121 
53 N Laukacheva, The Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and Nunavut (Toronto: 
TUP,2007), 6-7 
54 J Ferrante, Sociology: A Global Perspective (Stamford: Cengage Learning: Stamford,2013),360 
Union, the Government of Greenland itself emphasises that during colonial times there was 
intermarriage between the Inuit and Danish population, meaning that many Greenlanders 
today have mixed heritage.55  As a result, race cannot be held up as a distinctive characteristic 
of the Greenlandic People.    
c) Religion 
The Norse population in the Middle Ages became Christian around the time of their arrival,56 
and were a fully integrated part of the international network of Western Catholicism,57 but 
the Inuit population did not belong to this movement.58 One of the motivating factors for 
Denmark staking a claim to the territory of Greenland in the XVIII century was religious 
conversion. 59   Danish missionaries were successful in altering the religious landscape, 
Greenlanders embraced Christianity and Evangelical Lutheranism is now identified as the 
national faith. 60 
A further layer of complexity is added by the Church/State arrangements which are in place 
in Greenland.  Denmark still has an established Church, and the Lutheran Church of Greenland 
is technically one of its dioceses. 61   However, as part of the extensive legislative and 
 
55 Government of Greenland, International Relations, Facts about Greenland 
https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About-Greenland/Facts-on-Greenland  
56 N Lynnerup, The Greenland Norse: A biological anthropological study (Copenhagen: Commission for Scientific 
Research on Greenland, 1998), 51 
57 T Lacy, Ring of Seasons: Iceland, its Culture and History (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 127 
58 M Juergensmeyer and W Roof, Encyclopaedia of Global Religion (London: Sage, 2012) Vol 1, 483 
59 M Said, “Birth-pangs: Greenland’s Struggle for Independence” Loyola of Los Angeles Comparative Law 
Review, 281, 282 
60 Government of Greenland, International Relations, Facts about Greenland 
https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About-Greenland/Facts-on-Greenland 
61 A Kjaersgaard, Funerary Culture and the Limits of Secularization in Denmark (Zurich: Lit 2017), 26-28 
administrative powers which have been delegated to the Greenlandic Parliament, in 2010 the 
legislature in Nuuk passed a law granting the Lutheran Church a great deal of autonomy.62   
Pockets of pre-existing Pagan practices and beliefs are to be found, even amongst those who 
identify as Lutheran, 63  but in general terms the religious tradition which was originally 
imposed by external colonial forces has now been freely adopted. Arguably Greenland is not 
different from the rest of northern Europe in that respect, given that Christianity came along 
with the Roman Empire. 64   Historical oppression does not invalidate the autonomy of 
individuals who now choose to be part of the Church of Denmark, or for that matter the 
Church of England. Neither does it change the ways in which these denominations have 
shaped, and been shaped by, the unique cultural context in which they are set.    
Yet the fact that the national Lutheran religion, which has become a prevailing and cohesive 
force in terms of characterising the Greenlandic population as a People, is a comparatively 
recent import from the Danish culture, is crucial for our analysis.   
 
d) Language and Traditions 
Greenland is a bilingual territory, and both Greenlandic and Danish may be used in the public 
administration. Greenlandic is a polysynthetic language, 65  which belongs to the Eskimo-
 
62 S Andersen and M Kjaer, “The Legal Framework of Lutheran Churches: An Historical European Perspective”  
On Secular Governance: Lutheran Perspectives on Contemporary Legal Issues R Duty and M Failinger (eds), 
(Eerdmans: Michigan) (2016) 247-265, 264 
63 J Robert-Lamblin, “Ammassalik, East Greenland, end or persistence of an isolate? Anthropological and 
Demographical Study on Change” Man and Society Vol 10 (1986) 138 
64 R Fletcher, The Conversion of Europe: From Paganism to Christianity 371-1386 AD (London: Harper-Collins: 
London, 2012) 
65 K Murasugi, “Noun incorporation, non-configurationality and polysynthesis” A Carnie, Y Sato, and D Siddiqi 
(eds) The Routledge Handbook of Syntax (Routledge: Abingdon) (2014) 
Aleutic family.66 For speakers of Indo-European languages like Danish or English, Greenlandic 
is challenging to learn, even at a fairly basic level.  On the one hand, this signifies that it would 
be difficult to contest Greenland’s claim to a distinct linguistic character which is very much 
alive and strong, but on the other, the advantages of maintaining a bilingual framework are 
readily apparent in terms of trade, working arrangements and wider economic and social 
engagement with the rest of Europe, Canada and the USA. 
 It is also demonstrable that the Danish language belongs to the current infrastructure of 
Greenland. For instance, secondary education is primarily delivered through the medium of 
Danish, in large part due to the challenges of finding teaching staff who are sufficiently fluent 
in Greenlandic. 67  Even though Greenland has its own language, it also shares, and in 
functional terms remains dependent upon, the majority language of the Danish State. 
In relation to cultural traditions, whilst there are many  features common to  other Inuit 
societies, and also to mainland Denmark, Greenland undoubtedly does have its own particular 
character.68  To an extent this is due to its unique geography: for instance, there are no roads 
or rail links between settlements, meaning that life-styles have been shaped around travel by 
plane, helicopter or sea.69      
Greenland is proud of its distinctive architecture, art, craft, fashion and culture, fusing many 
influences. 70   For example, the modern Greenlandic art scene is heavily influenced by 
 
66 Government of Greenland, International Relations, Facts about Greenland 
https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About-Greenland/Facts-on-Greenland 
67 A Sørensen, Denmark-Greenland in the Twentieth Century (Copenhagen: Kirsten Caning, 2006), 133 
68 I Jensen, Things to Know About Greenland (Greenland: Greenland Travel, 2018) 
69 Government of Greenland, International Relations, Facts about Greenland 
https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About-Greenland/Facts-on-Greenland 
70 Explore Greenland https://visitgreenland.com/  
traditional tattoo-art and the local raw materials, but also by the touch of European 
impressionism.71   
Equally, many sub-State regions around the world can boast a distinctive geography, 
aestheticism or cuisine. It is often possible to break down areas into even decreasing units, 
whilst still identifying independent communities with particular identity, values and 
traditions.  This is sometimes observed with certain districts within large cities, yet at some 
point lines have to be drawn around the scale and significance of divisions. 
Overview 
In light of the foregoing, what does the Greenlandic context demonstrate about identifying a 
People?  It reveals something of a paradox.  On the one hand, nobody in either the political 
or the academic sphere is attempting to deny that the population of this island does in fact 
constitute a People.  This reality was officially recognised by the international community in 
the era of decolonisation and has remained a matter of consensus ever since. 72  In addition, 
we should find this unsurprising, since we have established that all of the elements of our 
working definition of a People have been satisfied.  Yet at the same time, we cannot escape 
from the unsettling observation that each of these individual factors has proved somewhat 
ambiguous when placed under a microscope. 
This reminds us that the current position was not the inevitable end point of historical events, 
and also that the paradigm is subject to change.  Peoples are not created by legislation or 
treaty, they are a factual reality, of which the law take cognisance.  As Greenland, or any other 
 
71 Visit Greenland, ‘Greenlandic Art Through Time’ https://visitgreenland.com/about-greenland/modern-
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society, drifts or evolves, its claim to peoplehood may grow or diminish.  Constitutions and 
constitutional lawyers cannot impose stasis, because Peoples are a question of fact, not law.  
The position at the moment when constitutional structures crystallised may not reflect the 
reality on the ground in later generations. 
In concrete terms, this means that constitutionalists must grapple with two distinct 
dimensions to these paradigms.  On the one hand, the very existence of Peoples is fragile and 
potentially precarious. As we shall discuss, the legal duties placed upon States include an 
obligation to respect the rights of Peoples to exist and to safeguard their future. Yet on the 
other hand, it cannot be denied that there is an inevitable ebb and flow of human populations 
and cultures, as communities emerge or become subsumed.   
The implications of this have not as yet been thoroughly explored,  precisely because these 
developments unfold over decades and centuries, and current modes of legal thinking about 
statehood, human rights and the autonomy of Peoples, only began to emerge in the second 
half of twentieth century. 73  To begin filling some of the remaining gaps in the legal 
commentary, we shall start by considering how the membership of a People interacts 
conceptually with citizenship of States. 
 
D: What is the relationship between membership of Peoples and Citizenship of States? 
As noted above, the respected commentator Wheatley cited the population of sovereign 
States as one clear example of a People for the purposes of International Law. We propose 
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that this is correct for a number of reasons.74 Firstly, it is closely allied to the philosophical 
and theoretical ideas which have underpinned our understanding of States and sovereignty 
since at least the Enlightenment.75  Any conception of sovereignty residing in the People must 
be predicated on the People being an identifiable reality.  Secondly, it is difficult to find a State 
unable to satisfy most of the diagnostic criteria proposed by Van der Vyver, and even where 
there is considerable diversity, there are generally pan-cultural, historical, artistic and 
linguistic strands.  Consider, for instance, the United Kingdom, the identity and uniqueness of 
its component parts do not render the concept of ‘British culture’ an empty vessel.76   
It might, of course, be argued that there are contexts where States were artificially 
manufactured for political reasons, and claims for overarching commonalities would be 
harder to substantiate.  We do not entirely foreclose that possibility: the anthropology of 
nation States is a field of study in itself, and one which resists hard certainties and sweeping 
generalisations.77 Even so, it is undeniable that the common and normative pattern is for a 
State to have a shared meta-culture and identity. 
The finding that the population of a sovereign State constitute a People, when coupled with 
the point that distinct communities within States are also at times Peoples for the purposes 
of International Law, leads us to an important conclusion to which we have briefly alluded: 
sometimes individuals are members of two (or potentially more) Peoples.  In anthropological 
terms, noting that human beings may embrace multiple identities is hardly ground-breaking,78  
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but it is a dimension of the situation which is frequently either overlooked or obscured in legal 
debates. 
There is a tendency for constitutional lawyers to consider multiple Peoples within States 
primarily in the context of political debates around devolution or independence, and as a 
consequence, the discussion is usually framed in terms of clashing claims and identity.  For 
example, even in the analysis of authors like Rezvani79 and Said,80 who cite the advantages of 
Peoples exercising autonomy within a parent State, as opposed to seeking independent 
statehood, there is an understanding of States and sub-State entities being distinct nuclei, 
sharing out rights and control.  The centre and regions are opposing bodies with competing 
interests, and a push and pull between in relation to the distribution of powers. 
At one level that is an entirely accurate description of the situation on the ground, and the 
parcelling out of powers and spheres of responsibility between parent States and territories 
is premised on a straightforward reflection of reality.81  Wrangling between regional and 
central Governments, of the type witnessed in recent years in Spain between Madrid and the 
pro-independence executive in Barcelona, are a stark example of this phenomenon. 82  There 
are hard-edged questions about which body is ultimately empowered to make decisions on 
public taxation, administration and spending, and to whom exactly are its representatives 
accountable. 
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Yet it remains true that once we have moved away from colonial paradigms, in which one 
People is subject or subordinate to another People (a position which is rightly condemned in 
modern International Law),83 we must conclude that at least two Peoples will necessarily exist 
in a coterminous fashion, whenever a distinct population nested within a State constitutes a 
People.   This will produce a range of responses from individual citizens, inter alia: proud 
ownership of multiple cultural identities,84 conscious rejection of one identity,85 fluctuation 
between identities and indifference to the whole question. 
Consequently, constitutional lawyers should be aware that dissatisfaction and tension 
between dual identities ought not to be treated as the expected, default position, and even 
where historically there has been systemic oppression, individuals may opt for dual identity.   
For example, the leading Welsh independence party, Plaid Cymru, currently has around 8000 
members, in contrast to the 125,500 of the Scottish National Party. 86   This represents 
approximately 0.26% of the Welsh population,87 compared with the much higher 2.5% in 
Scotland.88 Thus, political support for an independent Wales, and abandonment of British 
identity, is comparatively weak at the present time, even though pride, celebration and 
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consciousness of Welsh national identity remain very strong,89 and devolved government is 
firmly embedded in the legal framework at both Welsh and UK level.90   
It is inevitable that successful paradigms attract less academic and political comment, but it 
is essential to stress that these contexts are not invariably a source of friction. Distinct 
populations are part of the composition of the State People, and for this reason, we have 
adopted the term “Component Peoples” to describe them, bringing us to the final stepping 
stone in our analysis:    
 
E: What is the proper response of States to the existence of Component Peoples, when it 
comes to ordering their constitutional and legal frameworks? 
In answering this question, we shall divide our analysis into two parts: the external legal 
obligations which States are required to meet, and the domestic considerations in ordering 
their constitutional arrangements. 
 
E1) International law duties which must be satisfied 
To begin with, there is the question of International Law rights and duties.  What are the 
implications of the right to self-determination which we have seen to be vested in Peoples?  
In a seminal discussion, Cristescu91 concluded that it does not amount to a general right of 
unilateral secession, and a large number of other highly influential commentators, including 
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Higgins92 and Cassese,93  follow his lead in this respect.  The same authors do, nevertheless, 
acknowledge that there may be a right to secession where ‘peoples, territories and entities 
[are] subjugated in violation of international law’.94 
Said argues persuasively that there is an inherent tension between what she terms the right 
of communities to independent government, and the desirability of peace, stability and 
certainty.95  In broad terms, moves which jeopardise the integrity of sovereign States are not 
seen in a positive light, and assertions of a right to secession are not readily accepted by the 
international community.  Consequently, there is no universal obligation to follow Denmark’s 
pattern in facilitating the possibility of independent statehood. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the right to self-determination is weak. As stated, 
making the leap to full sovereignty is only one of the ways in which it may be exercised.  
Importantly, although not entirely uncontested, the overwhelming weight of academic 
opinion is now in favour of the idea that the right to self-determination includes the right to 
internal self-determination, or in other words, the freedom of Peoples to enjoy autonomy 
within the sphere of the Sovereign State.96  
At first glance this appears to be a neat solution to the conundrum, as it preserves the status 
quo with regard to the territorial integrity of Sovereign States, whilst simultaneously enabling 
communities to enjoy their legally mandated freedoms.  The stumbling block is that it leaves 
open the troublesome question of what such self-determination actually looks like.  
 
92  R Higgins, Problems and Processes: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: OUP, 1994) (2004 
Edition), 123-125 
93 A Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: CUP, 1995) 146 
94 A Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development on the Basis of UN 
Instruments UN Doc ECN4/Sub2/404/Rev 1, 1981, para 173 
95 M Said, “Birth-pangs: Greenland’s Struggle for Independence” Loyola of Los Angeles Comparative Law 
Review , 281, 289-290 
96 A Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: CUP, 1995) 154 
Murswiek97 suggests that action taken by State authorities which is aimed at depriving a 
People of its specific characteristics (i.e. those facets which make it a People) is incompatible 
with the right to self-determination.  This must be correct, as if the right to self-determination 
is not predicated on a right to continued existence, it is an empty shell, but how far does it go 
beyond this, and how much autonomy is sufficient?  The uncertainty provides scope for 
dissatisfied voices to argue that whatever arrangements a State has in place, they fail to satisfy 
the true requirements of self-determination, triggering claims of subjugation and an 
accompanying right to secession.   
Against this backdrop, Higgins observes that the intensity of the desire for secession is 
ordinarily linked to the degree of human rights oppression experienced by the group wishing 
to secede.98  At one level, it is extremely difficult to argue with the contention that secure 
communities whose freedom and dignity are respected will have less reason to agitate for 
independence than those who are persecuted and abused.  In other words, States can be 
proactive in preserving their territorial integrity by eschewing maltreatment of Component 
Peoples.99  The difficulty is that when we turn out attention to the level of Constitutional Law, 
as we are about to do, the position becomes more complex. 
 
E2) Constitutional Law Responses 
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From this angle, we are confronted with a stumbling block in Higgins’ argument, but also a 
means of addressing the same.  
 
E2a) The Problem of Competing Demands 
As we have established, legal and constitutional frameworks ought to be constructed in a way 
which respects the right to self-determination enjoyed by Component Peoples.  The difficulty 
is that there are other, equally key imperatives, which a liberal, democratic State is bound to 
uphold in respect of its citizens. Guarantees of human rights and equality flowing from 
constitutional and international instruments cannot be bypassed, meaning that fundamental 
problems arise when there is a head on collision between collective and individual rights. 
Added to which the overlapping membership between Component Peoples and State 
Peoples, and the sometimes porous borders between the two, further complicate conflicts of 
collective and individual rights. One of the motivations for our dissecting the Greenlandic 
paradigm so carefully in previous sections, was to reveal just how intricate the interplay 
between Peoples can in fact become.   If there still so much fluidity and ambiguity in a setting 
like that, how much more might exist in less hard-edged paradigms?      
Lest it should be imagined that these problems are in any way abstract or removed from 
reality. Consider some of the disputes around language in public administration and 
education, in contexts like Quebec100 or Catalonia.101  These debates are too complex to 
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rehearse in detail here, but similar tropes are reprised again and again.  In essence, the 
recurrent question is that of when it is appropriate to prioritise the language of a Component 
People, particularly to the exclusion or marginalisation of the tongue of the State People.   
For instance, the linguistic medium through which public universities and school operate is a 
hotly contested area.  Is the availability of French and Catalan in schools in those territories 
sufficient, or is it necessary to ensure that educational provision is predominantly or even 
exclusively delivered in that language?  How can the desire to protect the future of the 
language of a Component People102  be balanced against the rights of individuals whose 
interests or preferences may be opposed to this (e.g. children for whom the language of the 
State People is already a second language, students who have additional education needs or 
whose families may relocate to another part of the country in the medium term)? 
This is just one example of one kind of debate which can arise. Our point for present purposes, 
is that an ingrained constitutional stance of automatically prioritising the collective rights of 
the Component People (as asserted by organs of regional Government) would not be 
compatible with the requirement to respect the individual human rights of those who wished 
to oppose the policy.  As Handler demonstrates, social and legal fissures around language use 
are not amenable to simplistic analysis or resolution, and any blunt instrument approach 
would undermine, rather than uphold, human rights.103   
Consequently, in order to honour the liberal democratic project of respecting both individual 
human rights, and international law obligations, the competing interests in these situations 
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must be carefully weighed in the balance by organs of the State.104  Inevitably, there will be 
some occasions when the scales tip against the collective rights of the Component People. It 
is only to be expected that factions on the losing sides of legal and political tussles will feel 
some resentment at the outcome, which in turn may manifest as a resurgence of pro-
independence agitation.105  Thus, Higgins suggestion that safeguarding human rights may 
ward off secessionist sentiment, needs to be at the very least qualified. 
So where does this leave constitutional lawyers when faced with these competing demands? 
This is a key question, and we would suggest that the answer lies in the very nature of 
Constitutions, and one facet in particular of the constitutional project. We contend that public 
“buy-in” to constitutional norms has the capacity to assist in reducing the resentment 
experienced by groups who feel themselves to be on the losing side in cases of conflict, and 
also to address some of the human complexity around the identities of State and Component 
Peoples in a positive way.  Therefore, we now turn out attention to exploring the importance 
of “Constitutional Culture” in this context, as we propose that this phenomenon has a critical 
role to play in simultaneously meeting the dual demands of assuring autonomy for 
Component Peoples, on the one hand, and providing parity of individual rights for all persons 
within the State, on the other. 
 
E2b) The Role of a Constitution and Constitutional Culture 
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The role and nature of Constitutions is undeniably a legal and philosophical question of great 
depth and antiquity, and is not a subject into which we would hope to delve deeply in the 
span of a brief article.106  For our present purposes, it suffices to observe that at one level, a 
Constitution may be properly understood as the body of law within which the juridical and 
political framework of a State is encased.107 Whilst there is nothing incorrect about such a 
definition, a number of influential commentators have demonstrated that it is only one 
dimension of a multidimensional reality, pleading that Constitutions should be understood as 
a more profound social force and entrenched collective project. 
As Frankenberg argues, every Constitution is the product of its own unique history moulded 
by the values, prejudices and preoccupations of its architects.108  Furthermore, he endorses 
the contention of Llewellyn, that this holds good even in the absence of a unified written 
instrument,109 on the basis that a Constitution is an institution, and “a set of ways of living 
and doing”.110  On this basis, all States have a Constitutional Culture, whatever form their 
constitutional arrangements take as far as legal theorists are concerned.  There will always be 
identifiable shared practices and expectations about the organisation of collective life and 
governance. 
Nevertheless, it should come as no surprise that much of the discussion around Constitutions 
as societal institutions, and the closely related concept of Constitutional Culture, originated 
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in the United States, a country quite literally founded on a Constitution, and in which the text 
still has totemic value for citizens on the street, as well as lawyers.111 
Mazzone112 makes a persuasive case that although the “Founding Fathers” and subsequent 
political elites have tended to hog the limelight in academic discussion, the entire American 
experiment with constitutional government could never have succeeded without 
Constitutional Culture, which he interprets as  the disposition of the majority of ordinary 
individuals to recognise and accept their society being ordered according to the constitutional 
document. 
This contention is strengthened by parallel observations from lawyers in other jurisdictions.  
For instance, Heller’s view, forged in the historical German context, is that the content and 
operation of Constitutions is determined “not just by text, judges or legislators, but by the 
citizens who are its addressees and observe its norms”.113 
The essence of such arguments is that to function in an effective and meaningful way, 
Constitutions must be embraced by the People they bring together.  If their principles are not 
respected voluntarily, and their mechanisms for governance and dispute resolution are not 
perceived as just and reasonable, then they will inevitably break down.  The case is persuasive, 
but not entirely unassailable. For instance, Weis makes the point that in contexts like Australia 
there is a deficit of Constitutional Culture, in the sense that the Constitution as an institution 
is not high in the public consciousness and consequently not prominent in popular debates.114  
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This commentator maintains that this is a regrettable and problematic reality, but others such 
as Goldsworthy suggest that it is not intrinsically negative where no ill effects are being felt.115 
We would argue that the solution lies in what is really meant by Constitutional Culture.  
Certainly, the phrase does not need to refer to the incarnation of the concept observable in 
the United States, in which there is a revered and unified text, with battles over how it should 
be read in each new generation.116  Indeed, the crucible in which the US Constitution was 
formed was that of the Constitutional Culture of Enlightenment Britain.  One of the chief and 
repeated complaints put forward by John Adams, one of the intellectual engines driving the 
American Revolution, was that imposing tax on citizens without their consent was an affront 
to fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the British Constitution.117  Had there not been a 
strong, pre-existing Constitutional Culture, Adams would not have been able to deploy this as 
an highly effective and emotive rallying call.  People responded because their sense of what 
it meant to be British was bound up with the belief that Britain’s system of government 
respected liberty.  Freedom under the Constitution was part of their sense of identity. 
Constitutional Culture comes in many shapes and guises, depending on the politics and 
society within States, it will be unique in every context, and we would go so far as to suggest 
that citizens need not necessarily brandish the word Constitution in debates in order for 
Constitutional Culture to exist.  As Weis noted with Australia, this is not invariably the case, 
 
115 J Goldsworthy, “Constitutional Cultures, Democracy and Unwritten Principles” University of Illinois Law 
Review (2012) 683, 684-90 
116 R Utiz, The Constitutional Text in the Light of History (Budapest, Central European University Press, 2005), 
109 
117 J Adams, “Instructions Adopted by the Braintree Town Meeting” (September 24th 1765) Adams Papers, 
Digital Edition, Massachusetts Historical Society, http://www.masshist.org/publications/adams-
papers/index.php/view/PJA01d073   
even in liberal democracies,118 but we do not observe Australia to be falling apart at the seams 
as we write.  In our view, demonstrating a Constitutional Culture is not about pointing to the 
currency of touchstone, magic words, but about ascertaining that citizens are on board with 
the legal and political set of ways of “living and doing”, which give a Constitution its true 
form.119  We need to ask whether citizens in general are aware of, and invested in, the key 
constitutional values and rights which govern collective life. This is what truly matters, as 
opposed to the labels applied in describing them, which are very much a secondary 
consideration. This recognition of shared norms worthy of respect is what a Constitution 
should provide for a State People, naturally including members of Component Peoples as part 
of that body. 
Constitutional Culture exists in the realm beyond legal documents and principles, although 
these are often an important factor in its formation. Ultimately, it is the praxis and 
assumptions of collective life which are the bedrock of Constitutional Culture, and these carry 
more weight than declarations of abstract theory.  This is why it is reasonable to assert that 
freedom of expression was not part of the Constitutional culture of the USSR, even though it 
was in theory assured by a written instrument.120  Conversely, this explains why a lack of 
Constitutional Law level guarantees of self-determination for Greenland is not a source of 
great angst.  It would not be compatible with the Constitutional Culture of modern Denmark 
to snatch back powers from Greenland, as in practice and by consensus it embraces 
International Law and respect of minority rights. 
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Therefore, the Constitutional Culture of a State may exacerbate or ameliorate frustrations felt 
by Component Peoples. Needless to say, it would be unrealistic to imagine that many societies 
will reach a stage where every member of a Component People abandons any dream of 
secession, and ceases political efforts to achieve this.  Given the diversity of human beings 
and the nature of democracy, a broad range of opinions is always to be expected.  The mere 
presence of independentist parties is certainly not a sign of dysfunction!  But it is possible to 
create a context where strong, widely supported, secessionist movements are far less likely.  
When clashes around competing rights do arise, it is obviously positive if the judicial and 
administrative processes for their resolution are deemed worthy of respect, even where the 
outcomes may be disappointing.  Additionally, it is even better if these processes are 
understood as the embodiment of an institution in which individuals feel invested as 
members of the State People. 
As we have already stressed, the flourishing of Constitutional Culture in this sense is not 
within the gift of lawyers.  The tragic experiences of many jurisdictions in Africa demonstrate 
that the adoption of a constitutional text is not a panacea to end internecine strife,121  nor a 
mystical way to instantly conjure up harmony and shared identity.  Constitutional Culture is 
built up by the decisions of succeeding generations, not the proceedings of committees, but 
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Conclusion 
We have seen that both Peoples and Constitutional Culture are realities of which lawyers 
must take cognisance, although are moved by societal forces beyond their control. The 
management of relations between State and Component Peoples is not a comparable 
exercise to defining the distribution of powers between the executive and the legislature, or 
the office of Prime Minister.  Peoples, and the cultural factors which give them form are fluid, 
constantly evolving realities, and the number of Component Peoples within a State will not 
always be a clear-cut question, it may even alter dramatically within the lifespan of a 
constitutional framework.  Additionally, the State People and Component People are not 
separate entities, as members of Component People also belong to the State People, and in 
many instances very enthusiastically so. 
A positive Constitutional Culture can serve all members of the State People, including those 
who are also within Component Peoples.  As we have seen, Constitutional Culture is a societal 
project, building and developing over time.  It does not exist exclusively in legal instruments, 
but lives in the perceptions, norms and expectations of the prevailing majority of citizens. 
Yet this is not to suggest that constitutional lawyers are powerless and condemned to cling 
passively to driftwood they are buffeted by social tides.  Their contribution is critical in helping 
Constitutional Culture to form and develop in positive directions, and although this may not 
suffice to maintain harmony and social cohesion, it is certainly necessary.  Legal principles, 
structures and even ideals are what provide the life-sustaining soil which enables growth, and 
without these, Constitutional Culture cannot even germinate, much less put forth roots and 
branches.  Moreover, like literal soil, the nature and quality of this material will determine the 
character and health of the organism it nurtures.   
  
